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Abstract: We discuss an emerging group of successful parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
that combine anti-establishment appeals with support for moderate policies of political and social 
reform, which we term anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs). Examples include the Simeon II 
National Movement (Bulgaria), Res Publica (Estonia), New Era (Latvia), Freedom and Solidarity 
(Slovakia), TOP09 and Public Affairs (Czech Republic) and Positive Slovenia. We carry out a 
comparative analysis using the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) technique to 
identify the conditions under which AERPs made electoral breakthroughs in the period 1997-2013. We 
identify five sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough representing distinct combinations of several 
causal conditions: high corruption, rising corruption, rising unemployment, previous success of new 
parties and the previous success of new parties. We conclude by reviewing the implications of our 
findings for further research. 
 
In recent years fears have been expressed that the falling away of the EU accession 
conditionalities and the impact of the global recession is the leading rise of radical-right 
and illiberal populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Rupnik 2007, Bohle & 
Greskovits 2009). Electoral breakthroughs by groupings such as Jobbik in Hungary in 
2010 are often taken as exemplars of this trend (Jordan 2010, Wolin 2011). However, 
without denying the importance of the growth on the radical right for European politics 
the nature of many new anti-establishment parties has in the region been incompletely 
understood. 
A number of new parties in CEE – at least in their initial stages – have combined 
classically populist characteristics such as anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric, espousal 
of direct democracy, a stress on moral renewal or technocratic expertise (Schedler 1997) 
with moderate pro-market policies and a liberal (or relatively neutral) stance on socio-
cultural questions. Certain such parties such as, Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria 
in 2001 (Barany 2002) or Res Publica in Estonia in 2003 (Taagepera 2006) enjoyed 
landslide electoral success and immediately became central players in new governing 
coalitions. Others achieved more modest success such as Public Affairs (VV) in the 
Czech Republic or Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia – which entered their 
respective parliaments in 2010 – but entered government coalitions with little difficulty. 
In other cases in CEE such parties have been conspicuous by their electoral marginality or 
absence.  
The rise of such parties has potentially far-reaching consequences for party systems and 
democracy in CEE, as unlike more radical populist groupings, such parties can achieve 
spectacular overnight electoral breakthrough and, even when they do not, usually have 
high coalition potential. In this article we analyse the conditions under which the electoral 
breakthroughs of such parties, which we term parties of anti-establishment reform 
(AERPs), can occur using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). 
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We proceed as follows. We first define our concept of the anti-establishment reform party 
(AERP) relating it to relevant literatures on new and outsider parties, and discussing 
parties we classify as AERPs. We then present the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA) method and briefly review its earlier use as a technique for analysing 
the emergence of new parties. Following that, we present our QCA analysis of conditions 
of breakthrough for AERPs in contemporary CEE party systems and report our findings. 
Finally, we reflect upon the implications of our findings and discuss how the concept of 
AERPs and the analytical strategy used might be extended to West European cases, where 
AERP-type parties have begun to break through in some states, such as Peppe Grillio’s 
Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy and Team Stronach in Austria. 
 
ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT REFORM PARTIES 
As Kevin Deegan-Krause (2010) has observed, despite their diversity, there are clear 
commonalities between new parties that have broken through in recent elections in CEE 
making it possible to speak of 
… not exactly a new party family (though in their cultural liberalism and anti-corruption 
emphases they share significant elements) and not exactly a new party type … but with 
strong and intersecting elements of both. Nor is it unique to Central Europe alone but 
elements of it have emerged also in the West. 
Many authors who have noted the phenomenon have viewed such parties as expressing a 
sub-type of populism, speaking of ‘new/centrist populism’ (Pop-Eleches 2010), ‘centrist 
populism’ (Učeň et al 2005; Učeň 2007) or ‘liberal populism’ (Mudde 2007). Others have 
defined them more narrowly as based on a distinct (anti-)political appeal or issue 
dimension: Bågenholm & Heinö (2010), for example, term them ‘anti-corruption parties, 
while Demker (2008) speaks of ‘virtue parties’ and Hartlieb (2013), stressing 
organisational as well as programmatic aspects, speaks of ‘anti-elite cyberparties’. 
We conceptualize these parties somewhat differently as anti-establishment reform parties 
(AERPs) that exhibit – to different extents – three core features: (1) a politics of 
mainstream reformism (2) usually framed in terms anti-establishment of appeal to voters; 
and (3) genuine organizational newness as a party.  
By ‘mainstream reformism’ we understand two things: firstly, that programmatically a 
party is committed to mainstream models of liberal democracy and  the market economy 
does not share either the inclination of radical right forces to ‘illiberal democracy’, 
illiberal ethnocentrism or social conservatism (Mudde 2007) nor the anti-capitalism of the 
radical left (March & Mudde 2005).1 AERPs have an active commitment to political 
reform seeking to make major changes to the political institutions or to the way politics is 
conducted or to improve, modernize or unblock the working of liberal democracy or the 
liberal market economy. Such themes might, depending on context, take the form of 
appeals to fight corruption, replace corrupt or inefficient elites with energetic and 
competent personnel; tackle overlooked policy areas; or create new democratic structures 
linking citizens and politicians (sometimes extending into anti-partyism); or  novelty of 
political style or a ‘project of newness’ (Sikk 2012).  
                                                        
1 Unlike Pop-Eleches (2010) in his characterisation of ‘centrist populists’ we do not regard euroscepticism as a non-
mainstream position, although most AERPs are not eurosceptic. 
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We also understand such parties as anti-establishment parties.2 We derive this term from 
Abedi’s work (2004) on ‘anti-political establishment parties’, that is parties that perceive 
themselves as challengers to establishment parties and see a fundamental divide between 
the people and the political establishment (Abedi 2004: 12).3  
The third element of our definition is that in organizational terms parties should be 
‘genuinely new’. In this article we apply Sikk’s (2005: 399) definition of new parties as 
those successful in elections for the first time that are “not successor to any previous 
parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important 
figures from past democratic politics among their major members” (Sikk 2005: 399; see 
also Sikk 2012). We thus exclude alliances and mergers between established parties, as 
well as parties which are products of breakaways from established parties.4 
In defining AERPs a group of parties in this way we are not asserting the existence of a 
coherent new party type or distinct sub-type, still less suggesting the emergence of a new 
party family.5 Rather we advance the term as a broad working category, whose validity 
will be tested by the search for common causation patterns and which may be revised in 
the light of empirical findings.6  Rather we have formulated the category of anti-
establishment reform party as an ideal type in the full expectation that the membership for 
some parties will be quite fuzzy.7 We thus advance the term as a broad working category, 
which may be revised in the light of empirical findings.8   
To identify AERPs empirically we first identified genuinely new parties and eliminated 
those regarded in the literature as on the radical-right or radical-left (Mudde 2007, March 
2010) or whose programmes or declarations clearly placed them on the radical right or 
left. We then examined party programmes and statements and used our case knowledge to 
distinguish those new parties making anti-establishment reformist appeals from more 
conventional political groups. We thus excluded some successful new parties, 
predominantly or radical right groupings (Poland 2001, Bulgaria 2005 Hungary 2010) or 
                                                        
2 We avoid the term ‘populist’ because we feel it is imprecise: even minimal definitions such as that of Mudde 
(2004:542) tend conflate anti-establishment appeal and (moralistic) anti-political appeals, which while often 
empirically associated are, we contend, conceptually distinct.  Although for the simplicity we AERPs in this paper 
in a conventional dichotomous way, we are sympathetic to the view that categories such as party families and party 
types should be viewed configuratively as ‘fuzzy sets’ 
3 In our use of the term we focus on the first part of Abedi’s definition: on how AERPs frame themselves in relation to 
established parties Many AERPs do, however, use the ‘populist’ construction of People vs Establishment Abedi 
refers to. Abedi’s definition also includes a third element: that a party challenge the status quo on major policy and 
political system issues. For our cases parties’ political reformism challenges the status quo on a major ‘political 
system issue’. We avoid label ‘anti-political establishment party’ because we find it ambiguous.  
4 We take this to be to be parties formed where a majority of parliamentary deputies have come from a single 
established party. This is slightly different from Sikk (2005: 399), where the last condition excludes ‘participation 
by prime ministers and significant portions of cabinet ministers and members of parliament’. 
5  This is one of the reasons why we remain wary of the ‘centrist populist’ label – efforts to clarify the once ambiguous 
label of ‘populism’ have rendered it a rigid conceptual category (Sikk 2009). 
6 The different pathways to electoral success which, we anticipate, QCA will highlight may,for example, enable us to 
clarify both the nature and membership of this group of parties – and, indeed, to explore the extent to which it is a 
coherent group. 
7 We are sympathetic to the view that many categories such as party families and party types should be viewed as ‘fuzzy 
sets’ whose different elements need not logically imply one another. However, our approach to classification is this 
papter close to the ‘family resemblance’  approach discussed by Sikk (2009), which argues that not classifying 
criteria need necessarily be present for a positive classification decision to be made 
8 Indeed the validity of the category will to an extent be tested by the search for shared causation patterns The different 
pathways to electoral success which, we anticipate, QCA will highlight may, for example, enable us to clarify both 
the nature and membership of this group of parties – and, indeed, to explore the extent to which it is a coherent 
group. 
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Green parties (Estonia 2007, Czech Republic 2006) In all instances, the unit of analysis 
and scorings refer to a party at the particular time when a parliamentary election took 
place: CEE parties, both new and established, can experience considerable fluctuation and 
evolution in their identity and programmatic appeals .9 
In parliamentary elections in CEE since 1994, we believe 21 parties can be identified as 
successful AERPs.10 Strikingly, as Pop-Eleches (2010) notes in relation to 
‘unconventional parties’ more broadly defined, AERPs as a phenomenon of CEE is 
mostly confined to the last 10-15 years:11 Pop-Eleches (2010) plausibly explains this in 
terms of the dynamics of ‘third generation’ post-communist elections, when, having 
elected and been disappointed with the government performance of conventional parties 
of left and right, voters turn to unconventional new parties.12  
We therefore investigate AERPs’ performance focusing on ‘third generation’ elections 
(Pop-Eleches, 2010) to the lower house of CEE parliaments that took place between 
September 1997 and December 2012. We list the AERPs included in our analysis below 
in table 1.13 We have excluded from our analysis Romania–where no AERPs have 
materialized. We contend that this may be related to the markedly low level of democratic 
freedoms in that country compared to other EU states (as indicated by Freedom House 
political rights and press freedom scores); for the sake of analytical clarity excluded this 
country from our analysis.  
 
QCA AS A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING PARTY EMERGENCE  
To examine the emergence of AERPs we employ Fuzzy Set form of Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a comparative technique which seeks to formalize the 
logic of qualitative case-based comparison by identifying relevant configurations of 
causes (conditions) and effects (outcomes) using fuzzy algebra and sets (Ragin 1987, 
2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Rather than coding the presence or absence of conditions 
and outcomes dichotomously as in the original Crisp Set version of QCA (csQCA) (Ragin 
1987), fsQCA codes cases in terms of their degree of set membership in outcome and 
                                                        
9 Some parties such as Smer in Slovakia or Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland combine AERP features with clear 
conventional ideological appeals, often using the latter as subsequent consolidation and party-building strategy to 
transform themselves into more mainstream parties of left or right..  
10 Slovakia’s 1998 election would classify as a positive case because of the success of the Party of Civic Understanding 
(SOP) (8.0 per cent). However, we do not classify this as a ‘third generation’ election as in marked the first time that 
centre-right liberal/Christian Democrat opposition gained office.  
11 Only three AERPs were successful before the ‘third generation’ election:  the Bulgarian Business Bloc in 1994 and 
the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) and Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) (both  in Slovakia in 1998). 
12 More simply, it might be that parties and party systems in new democracies require a certain interval to become 
‘established’ –organizationally, electorally and in the public mind – implying a certain delay before anti-
establishment parties can become meaningful challengers. Other authors make broadly the same point about timing 
Deegan-Krause & Haughton (2009), for example, posit the gradual erosion of parties which formed and established 
themselves in the immediate post-transitional period, because of accumulative effect of the post-communist 
environment (low levels of party identification with parties; weak party organizations; high (perceived) levels of 
corruption). 
13 It may be objected that outset set of AERPs overlaps heavily with that of new parties and that our analysis is thus, in 
effect, a study of successful new parties. This is a valid empirical observation. However, as a category AERPs are a 
conceptually distinct subset of ‘new parties’ which, we contend, while relevant as measure of change and 
(in)stability in party systems, but lacks meaning in itself. The fact that most successful new parties in CEE have 
been AERPs and that – contrary to the fears of some observers - that only a small minority have emerged on radical 
right or radical left is striking – and we believe, underlines the importance of our research. In other regions (for 
example, Western Europe) we would anticipate a more diverse set of new parties. 
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causal conditions. Degree of membership in outcomes and conditions are expressed as 
values ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a ‘crossover 
value’ of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5. 
QCA is well suited to the cross-national comparison of the varying success of new types 
of party, where a relatively high number of cases and high levels of casual complexity. By 
causal complexity we understand the fact variables can work in distinct configurations 
rather than individually and the fact that there may be several causal paths producing the 
same outcome (equifinality). QCA is able to capture a mix both of causes common to 
instances of a phenomenon and those distinct to specific paths, which conventional 
quantitative multivariate analysis can struggle with, while allows analysis of a large 
number of cases, which would overwhelm conventional qualitative case study methods. It 
has thus been used as an analytical tool to examine the comparative success of new 
emerging party types across Europe, for which such causal complexity – usually the 
configuration of multitude of social and institutional factors – is the norm (Redding & 
Viterna 1999; Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). 
 
SELECTING AND OPERATIONALIZING QCA CONDITIONS 
In accordance with standard fsQCA practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), we first 
define the outcome condition and potential causal conditions and expressing them in 
fuzzy set terms. However, as discussed below, in contrast to most QCA-based studies of 
new party emergence, we use elections rather than countries as our unit of analysis. Each 
election is assigned a degree of membership in each condition ranging from 1.0 (full 
membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a ‘crossover value’ of maximum 
ambiguity set at 0.5. Although expressed numerically, the degrees of set membership are 
anchored in researchers’ theoretically-based judgments, with at least three key anchor 
points (0, 0.5 and 1), each corresponding to a verbal description. Where raw data for 
conditions is continuous, set memberships are calculated following the direct calibration 
technique proposed by Ragin (2008: 85-105).14 
 
Outcome: AERP electoral breakthrough (BREAKTHRU) 
In this article, we focus on the initial breakthrough of AERPs. These breakthroughs are 
clearly identifiable events with immediate consequences for democratic governance and 
longer term patterns of party system change. This focus also reflects our understanding of 
AERPs more as a political strategy, than a party family manqué: unless they disintegrate, 
AERPs may transform themselves after initial breakthrough into more conventional 
programmatic parties of varying ideological hues, downplaying or dropping their anti-
establishment appeals (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). Such processes of 
transformation and consolidation are, however, beyond the scope of this article. 
Accordingly, we use single elections as our units of analysis. In crisp set analysis, the 
coding of breakthrough would be straightforward – whether an AERP had achieved a 
certain level of electoral support (1) or not (0). For fuzzy set QCA analysis, the coding is 
more nuanced.  We first defined the outcome set as AERP breakthrough and specified 
thresholds of full membership, full non-membership and maximum ambiguity (0.5 
                                                        
14 The calibration was conducted in R using the ‘QCA’ package (version 1.0-5, Duşa & Thiem 2012) . 
 6 
membership) (see Table 1), above which the case is more in than out of the set and below 
which it is more out than in. Based on these anchors, we then used the method of direct 
calibration suggested by Ragin (2008: 71-108) to transform the raw data (AERPs’ 
electoral support in an election) and calculate individual cases’ membership in the 
outcome set.15 
 
Table 1. Electoral support for AERPs 1997-2012  
Election Successful AERP Votes % Set membership 
 in BREAKTHRU 
BGR 2001 Simenon II Movement (NDSV) 42.7 1.00 
BGR 2005 – 0.0 0.00 
BGR 2009 Movement for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) 39.7 1.00 
CZE 2002 – 0.0 0.00 
CZE 2006 –  0.0 0.00 
CZE 2010 TOP09, Public Affairs (VV) 27.6 1.00 
EST 1999 – 0.0 0.00 
EST 2003 Res Publica 24.6 0.99 
EST 2007 – 0.0 0.00 
EST 2011 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 1998 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2002 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2010 Politics Can Be Different (LMP) 7.5 0.54 
LTU 2000 New Union (SL) 19.6 0.98 
LTU 2004 Labor Party (DP) 28.4 1.00 
LTU 2008 National Resurrection Party (TPP) 15.1 0.92 
LTU 2012 Way of Courage (DK) 9.8 0.70 
LVA 1998 New Party (JP) 7.3 0.53 
LVA 2002 New Era (JL) 24.0 0.99 
LVA 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
LVA 2010 – 0.0 0.00 
LVA 2011 Zalters Reform Party (ZRP) 21.3 0.99 
POL 1997 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2001 Law and Justice (PiS) 9.5 0.68 
POL 2005 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2007 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2011 Palikot Movement (RP) 10.5 0.74 
SVK 2002 SMER, Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) 21.5 0.99 
SVK 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
SVK 2010 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 12.2 0.82 
SVK 2012 Ordinary People (OLaNO) 11.4 0.79 
SVN 2008 –  0.0 0.00 
SVN 2011 Positive Slovenia (PS-LZJ), Virant List (DLGV) 36.9 1.00 
Source: European Elections Database and websites of national electoral authorities. 
Scores for parties with less than 4% were not used, resulting in formal raw score of 0.0. 
 
How should ‘electoral breakthrough’ of an AERP be understood? AERPs have 
considerably greater vote winning potential than niche or radical parties that have been 
the focus of most earlier QCA studies of new party emergence (Redding & Viterna 1999; 
Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). In the elections we 
study, there have been two cases – Bulgaria 2001 and 2009 – where a single AERP was 
supported by more than a third of the electorate and one (Slovenia 2011) where the 
                                                        
15 Where two AERPs were successful – a very rare occurrence – we took their combined scores as our point of 
departure for coding. Empirically, there was only three such instance (Slovakia 2002, Czech Republic 2010 and 
Slovenia 2012) where we judged that the combining the electoral support of the two AERPs was meaningful. 
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combined vote for AERPs was above this level. We set the threshold of fully in the set at a 
level of massive electoral support (30 per cent of votes or more), when the AERP 
becomes the first or second biggest party and hence a major party in a coalition 
government or a major opposition party. We set the crossover point (0.5 set membership) 
at 7 per cent of the vote, which is sufficient to win parliamentary representation safely and 
to gain a share of seats relatively proportional to the party’s vote share, with the AERP 
becoming a minor governing or opposition party. We deem any election where there is no 
AERP vote to be fully out of the set (0). Because of data limitations, we have only coded 
support for AERPs in cases where they entered the parliament. However, we noted 
empirically in all elections under study here the presence of small or tiny AERP-like 
parties that failed to enter the parliament. However, such parties are fairly marginal and 
highly ephemeral it is often hard to find reliable data on their political orientation.  
 
Causal conditions 
The study of AERPs in CEE is a new area and unlike previous QCA studies of the 
emergence of new parties (Redding & Viterna 1999, Veugelers & Magnan 2005, 
Gherghina & Jiglau 2011) we cannot draw on a well-established literature to identify and 
operationalize favourable conditions for AERP breakthrough. Instead we are quite 
explicitly engaging in an exercise in theory building. In picking out such conditions we 
draw on a thin body of work which has so far addressed AERP-like parties directly, as 
well as on the literatures on the emergence of new parties and new party types, populism, 
and on our own specialist knowledge of key cases supplemented by secondary literature 
on CEE parties and elections. 16  
Although QCA is most commonly applied to test theories - drawing on well established 
literatures for its causal conditions it can serve as equally effective tool for build theory 
(Amenta & Poulsen, 1994; Rihoux & Ragin 2009; Ragin & Schneider 2011). The most 
important distinction between the two types of application is that researchers engaged in 
theory building should at the outset draw a clear distinction between analytical strategies 
focusing on causal sufficiency and strategies focusing on causal necessity (Ragin & 
Schneider 2011). 
As we are dealing with diverse group of parties whose electoral success is unlikely to be 
covered by one or more necessary conditions in this paper we adopt ‘sufficiency-centred 
strategy’. As Ragin & Schneider (2011) argue, if there is a conflict, a sufficiency-centred 
approach to theory-building will typically prefer a more detailed but more consistent 
solution which establishes clear connection between cause and effect for some cases to a 
more encompassing but less consistent solution.17 
 
Crisis and economic hard times 
One of the most prevalent explanations for the rise of new anti-establishment parties 
across Europe in recently elections among commentators is to view them as a response to 
                                                        
16 In terms of six approaches to selecting conditions outlined by Rihoux & Ragin (2008: 124-130), our work falls 
between the inductive approach drawing on case knowledge and the perspective approach where a set of causal 
conditions representing two or three different models are tested in the same model. 
17 As Ragin & Schneider (2011) put it sufficiency-centred theory-building approaches will focus on ‘emptying box 4’ 
(eliminating cases where causes are strong, but outcome weak). 
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the pressures exerted by the global economic downturn that began 2008-9 and the broader 
climate of austerity that resulted from it and parallel developments such as the Eurozone 
crisis (Bartels 2013; Cramme 2013; Krastev 2013; Van Biezen & Wallace H 2013: 
294-7). Such expectations echo the political science literature, where the inability of 
established political actors to deliver reasonable economic conditions is widely 
understood as a potential driver of (anti-incumbent or anti-establishment) protest voting 
for new parties (see, for example Roberts 2009).  This pattern has been more marked in 
CEE where party identification is weaker than in Western Europe and voter dealignment 
much higher (Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2012). We look therefore at two economic 
conditions that might be expected to enhance the chances of AERP breakthrough: 
economic contraction (NOGRO) and rising unemployment (INCUNEMP) 
The global economic downturn of 2008-9 affected all states in the region, but to markedly 
different degrees. Some had reduced growth rates, while other experienced sharp 
economic contraction. There were also national variations in rates reflecting local 
economic experiences and the varying success of different trajectories of post-communist 
reform.  
Economic contraction (NOGRO) has both direct effects on consumption and levels of 
public provision and broader socio-political effects in stoking public discontent with 
incumbents. Extreme levels of economic contraction also create a sense of social crisis 
which also serves voters to look for political alternatives. Such effects may be especially 
marked in CEE where governments have been expected to deliver economic growth at the 
levels offering a realistic perspective of catching up with richer West European members 
of the European Union. 
To operationalise this condition, we set the threshold for full membership (being “fully 
in”) at a 5 per cent decline in a country’s GDP. The minimum threshold (“fully out”) is 
set at economic growth of 5 per cent under because of very fast economic growth, a 
phenomenon empirically observed in CEE states at various points since 1989. We set the 
cross-over point at 0 per cent annual change in GDP, corresponding to a stagnant 
economy.   
We argue that it is more meaningful to look at economic growth level over two previous 
years, as the effects of economic growth might become visible with a slight delay.  We 
expect that a period of economic downturn, especially if very marked, may have socio-
psychological impact which is felt even if the economy subsequently picks up. As with 
rising unemployment, we would see it as generating a wider sense of economic insecurity 
underlining the vulnerability of small and often weak CEE economies. 
A second consequence of economic downturn is increasing unemployment 
(INCUNEMP). This directly and immediately impacts those made redundant and their 
families, but arguably also a far wider groups of voters who may begin to fear for their 
own job security.18 Even at relatively low levels, sharply increasing levels of 
unemployment represent a favourable condition for a turn to non-establishment politics 
and thus perhaps an AERP breakthrough. 
Hence, we incorporate a condition of sharply increasing unemployment (INCUNEMP) 
which we operationalise as the change in unemployment rates over the two years before 
                                                        
18 We do not include the level of unemployment per se as a condition. Levels of background unemployment can vary 
quite significantly between states and, while having undeniable social and political impacts, can quickly become 
socially and politically ‘normalised’. 
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the election. We set the maximum threshold, corresponding to full membership in the set 
at an increase of 3 percentage points and the lower threshold (“fully out of set”) at a 3 
percentage point decrease in unemployment levels. The crossover point is set at a near 
zero decrease of 0.5 percentage points.19  
As illustrated in table 2, these two, somewhat different conditions relating to the economy 
enable us to identify four distinct socio-economic conjunctures: economic contraction 
where GDP is falling and unemployment increasing; economic boom where GDP is 
increasing and unemployment falling; restructuring or reform where the economy is 
growth but shedding jobs; and recession with a social safety valve where unemployment 
is falling but the economy contracting. The final scenario is empirically unlikely and 
would correspond to a situation where there was a mass withdrawal from the labour 
market due to emigration or social policies promoting early retirement (Vanhyusse 2006).  
 
Table 2: Possible configurations of economic conditions 
 Rising unemployment 
(INCUNEMP) 
Falling unemployment 
(~INCUNEMP) 
Economic contraction (NOGRO) 
Recession 
(NOGRO*INCUNEMP) 
Recession with safety valve  
(NOGRO*~INCUNEMP) 
Economic growth (~NOGRO) 
Reform and restructuring 
(~NOGRO*INCUNEMP) 
Economic boom 
(~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP) 
 
Perceived corruption and distrust 
In contrast to explanations which foreground economic recession and the associated 
impacts of growing unemployment, some authors the rise of anti-establishment parties 
and movements as a crisis of confidence in conventional democratic politics and the 
honesty and competence of established elites and parties (Kaldor & Selchow 2013; Žižek 
2013).  In particular, the rise of AERP-like parties has been linked to levels of perceived 
corruption and the politicization of corruption (Deegan-Krause 2010; Bågenholm & 
Heinö 2010). This may be understood both in terms of direct concern about corruption 
and a focus for a more inchoate sense that political elites are self-serving, untrustworthy 
and unrepresentative.  
To operationalise levels of perceived corruption we use Transparency International’s 
annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which although often criticized as poorly 
reflecting “real” levels of corruption, is arguably a meaningful measure for the type of 
public concerns we wish to highlight. We thus define two corruption-related conditions 
                                                        
19 Some of the countries did not see any changes in unemployment levels in the election year. It is good QCA practice to 
avoid calibration at 0.5 set membership. We therefore set the cross-over point at a marginal improvement of 
unemployment situation, as it could be argued that unemployment needs to drop by more than 0.5 percentage points 
in order to be perceived as an improvement. 
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which we expect will have a positive effect on AERP breakthrough:20 the social 
perception of high corruption (HICORR) or the substantial increase in perceived levels of 
corruption (INCORR). 
 
We hypothesize that an election is a full member of this set of high levels of perceived 
corruption  (HICORR) if the CPI score for the year the election was held21 falls below 3.5, 
around the worst empirically achieved levels in the region since 1999 (Romania and 
Bulgaria). A case is fully out of this set if CPI reaches 5.5 – a benchmark level based on 
the lowest levels of perceived corruption in the region since that date (achieved only by 
Slovenia and Estonia). The crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is 4.6 reflecting 
a figure close to the median corruption rating for CEE across the period.  
We deem a case to be fully in the set of elections where there has been substantial 
increase in the level of perceived corruption (INCCORR) if CPI score decreases by 0.4 
points – indicating a substantial perceived deterioration in corruption. A case is a fully out 
of the condition if a country’s CPI score increases by 0.4 points over the preceding two 
years – i.e. there is a substantial improvement in the corruption situation. We set the 
cross-over point at a decrease in the CPI score just over zero (0.01) where there is neither 
improvement nor deterioration.22 
 
Political conditions  
In earlier iterations of this work we included a number of conditions relating to the party-
electoral context: the presence of pro-market incumbents; levels of turnout the strength of 
radical-right or radical-left; and the previous levels of voting for new parties. In this paper 
we retain just one such condition: previous levels of voting for genuinely new parties 
(HGENP). 
We did so largely for theoretical reasons. We have amended our conception of AERPs, 
which we no longer view as defined by liberal economic and social politics, but simply as 
having non-extreme mainstream positions on social and economic issues. The presence of 
discredited pro-market incumbents was thus no longer relevant to our analysis. While 
increased turnout is often associated with the success of new parties such as AERPs, we 
do not believe it is satisfactorily possible to distinguish cause and effect.  Careful 
examination of cases also let us to reconsider our early hypothesis regarding the role 
radical parties as competitors AERPs.  
Most electorally significant radical parties in CEE, we noted, are on the radical right, with 
radical left groups tending to be wholly marginal.23 However, more significantly we 
                                                        
20 Data from the Quality of Government dataset. For three elections in 1997 and 1998, change in corruption could not be 
calculated as CPI scores were not available in previous years. There is evidence from World Bank global 
governance indicators that at the time, Poland and Hungary were experiencing substantial reductions in corruption 
levels (~INCCORR = 0.01) while Latvia was undergoing a modest decline in perceived corruption (0.33). 
21 Data in CPI reports is usually gathered in the year preceding the headline year it is reported (e.g. the data reported in 
the CPI 2010 report was predominantly gathered in 2009). We have therefore applied the CPI score for the year 
preceding the headline year. 
22 As in a number of cases the CPI score did not change, we follow the same logic as with unemployment change earlier. 
We argue that the CPI score needs to be decrease slightly before an actual improvement in corruption levels is 
registered among voters. 
23 The one significant exception is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in elections in the Czech 
Republic, whose support is in the 15-20per cent range. 
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observed that – contrary to the some media coverage – most radical right parties in CEE 
appear to be essentially niche groupings with a limited ability to expand their electoral 
support, whose political and electoral heyday was in 1990s.24 
The existence of a history of support for genuinely new parties (HGENP) – is relevant to 
all party systems across the CEE region. Voters in many states with more fluid, less 
consolidated party systems such as have acquired a greater habit of voting for new parties 
as a result of weak or absent bonds with established parties or weaker expectation that 
established parties will remain established. However, there are uneven levels of party and 
party system consolidation and stability and electoral volatility across the CEE region 
(Powell & Tucker 2013). Therefore, we hypothesize that where there is a history of 
support for genuinely new parties, it reflects a presence of a significant pool of voters 
“available” to new parties, many of whom will perceive an emerging AERP as a credible 
challenger.25 
To operationalize this condition we took the maximum support for genuinely new parties 
in the previous two elections.26 A case is a full member of this condition (set membership 
= 1.0) if the combined support for genuinely new parties was 30 per cent or more in an 
election – enough to generate one new major party or a number of more minor 
breakthroughs. A case is fully out of this set only if no genuinely new party won votes in 
this period. The crossover point is set at 19 per cent –substantial support for one 
genuinely new parties or more modest support for a range of less successful new parties.   
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We analysed the outcome BREAKTHRU in terms of five socio-political conditions 
experienced by voters assumed to be relevant to an electoral breakthrough by an anti-
establishment reform party: level and growth of perceived corruption (HICORR and 
INCCORR); growth in unemployment (INCUNEMP); economic contraction 
(NOGRO)and the previous success of new parties (HGENP).27 
In line with good practice in fsQCA (Schneider & Wagemann 2010), we first tested all 
conditions to see if any of them (or any combination of them) could be regarded as a 
necessary cause, which would be required for any as BREAKTHRU to occur.  In line 
with expectations, we found that none of the conditions could be regarded as such. The 
two conditions which came closest to being necessary were rising corruption (INCORR) 
and rising unemployment (INCUNEMP). However, their consistency scores of 0.721 and 
0.622 respectively place them far below what is required for causal necessity.28 
                                                        
24 The cases where radical right parties or social populists did appear as dynamic competitors – Self-Defence and the 
League of Polish Families in 2001; Jobbik in Hungary in 2010; the radical nationalist bloc in Latvia in 2011 and the 
party of former Lithuanian president Paksas – were too few in number to justify the retention of this condition. 
Unlike many (Western European) studies of comparative party success, we also omit any condition relating to 
electoral systems.  There is limited electoral system variation across CEE: most states in the region use list based PR 
with formal national thresholds of 4-5 per cent or mixed electoral systems with a list PR element. 
25 Our measure of support for new parties broadly corresponds to what others term Type B or Extra-System volatility 
(Mainwaring et al 2009; Powell and Tucker 2013).  
26  We use the definition of genuinely new parties proposed by Sikk (2005). We were able to collect sufficient data to 
count all genuinely new parties with at least 0.5 per cent of electoral support. 
27  For all QCA analysis we used the R module QCA (Dusa & Thiem, A. 2012). 
28 Schneider & Wagemann (2012: 330) define a condition as causally necessary if across all cases set membership in it 
is greater than or equal to each case’s membership in the outcome. A consistency score of 0.9 is widely seen as 
minimum level at which a condition might plausibly be regarded as necessary.  
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This highlights that none of the (implicitly) mono-causal explanations advanced by 
commentators for the breakthroughs of AERP-type parties are satisfactory. Even when 
look simply for causal necessity rather than causal sufficiency – that is we allow that some 
additional factors are required for such breakthroughs – such blanket explanations are 
weak. AERPs thus cannot be adequately accounted by encompassing narratives typically 
used to frame them: popular reactions to economic hard times or the bubbling up of anti-
political, anti-corruption sentiments and the crisis of democratic governance. 
 
Seeking sufficient paths to AERP breakthrough 
We then generated a ‘truth table’ which shows the extent to which cases of AERPs 
breakthrough are consistent with each of 32 possible combinations of conditions (see 
Appendix). Cases are listed in the causal combination with which they are most 
consistent. Rows where no empirical cases are listed are ‘logical remainders’: counter-
factual cases which can be partially incorporated into some fsQCA solutions (see 
discussion below).  
As is clear from visual examination of the truth table, there is a large natural gap between 
cases of breakthrough - the least consistent of which has a consistency score of 0.707 - 
and cases where there was no AERP breakthrough.29 None of these negative cases had a 
set membership of more than 0.444 in any of the possible causal combinations (Czech 
Republic 2006).30 
These set memberships in causal combinations were logically minimized using the R 
QCA package to produce a reduced number of causal pathway. In line with normal 
fsQCA practice we generated three variant solutions: a conservative (complex) solution 
produced using only empirically-occurring cases; a parsimonious solution incorporating 
all logical remainders; and an intermediate solution, which incorporates some but not all 
logical remainders into the analysis, choosing only ‘easy counterfactuals’ on the basis of 
clearly assumptions about the directional effects that conditions would have in counter-
factual cases. 
To determine which causal configurations should be classified as leading to 
BREAKTHRU we set a consistency cut-off at 0.78 to reflecting the natural gap in the 
distribution of cases. This is slightly below the widely used cut-off of 0.8, but comfortably 
above the 0.75 minimum recommended in the literature (Rihoux & Ragin 2009: 87-112; 
Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 279) 
 
Minimising only the empirically existing cases of AERP breakthrough and non-
breakthrough we generated a conservative solution with a high level of consistency (0.85) 
with a relatively broad coverage (0.79). This solution identified five sufficient causal 
paths for AERP breakthrough.  Expressed in fsQCA notation, the paths and the cases they 
cover appear as follows: 
                                                        
29 The  PRI (proportional reduction of inconsistency) is additional measure intended to address the issue of rows that 
might be consistent with both the outcome and its negation (Schneider & Wagemann (2012: 242-44).  There is no 
agreed approach for addressing this issue in fsQCA. However, our calculation of the so-called PRODUCT using 
PRI and consistency score suggest that given the consistency cut-offs we have used none of the outcomes was mis-
specified.  
30 There is poorly fitting cases AERP breakthrough (Poland 2011) has a low consistency. We discuss this case more 
fully in our discussion of the logically minimized solutions. 
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~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP +           C1: BGR09 LTU04 LTU08 LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 SVK12 
~NOGRO* INCCORR *~INCUNEMP*~HICORR +        C2 : EST03, LTU04, LTU12  
~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*~HGENP + C3 : BGR01 LTU00 POL01 SVK02 
NOGRO* INCCORR * ~HGENP * INCUNEMP* ~HICORR C4 : CZE10, HUN10, SLN11 
NOGRO *INCCORR * ~HGENP *~INCUNEMP *HICORR +   C5 : LVA11  
→ BREAKTHRU 
 
As often occurs in fsQCA some cases have membership in more than one path, suggesting 
that in these elections overlapping causal processes were at work.  
Expressed in more natural language, the paths state that AERP breakthrough takes place 
in five sets of circumstances, three of which (paths C1-C3) 31 entail relatively good 
economic times (~NOGRO),two of which occur during periods of economic contraction 
(NOGRO).  
In untroubled economic times, AERP breakthroughs occur when there is increasing 
corruption and a relatively unstable party system (path C1); when there low but increasing 
corruption and declining unemployment (path C2); or when unemployment rises in the 
context of high corruption (path C3). 
In periods of economic contraction, AERPs will break through when there is a stable 
party system combined with low but increasing corruption and increasing unemployment 
(path C4) or high and increasing corruption, but falling unemployment (path C5). 
Conservative solutions are often quite complex and difficult to interpret. However, a 
number of patterns are immediately striking: first, contrary to the view of AERPs as 
‘crisis parties’ in CEE AERPs are not purely – or even mainly – products of economic 
contraction. Three of the five paths to AERP breakthrough, covering  12 cases (combined 
unique coverage 0.362), take place in a context of economic growth. Conversely, paths 
C4 and C5 which feature elections taking place against a backdrop of economic 
contraction –cover only four cases (combined unique coverage 0.19). 
Second, there to be at least one distinct sub-regional path. Path C4 features only elections 
in three recession-hit Visegrad states with previously stable party systems: Hungary in 
2010, the Czech Republic in 2010 and Slovenia in 2011. Paths C1-C3, by contrast, cover 
the Baltic states, Slovakia and Bulgaria where AERP-type parties were first identified 
(Účen 2007; Sikk 2006). 
Path 5 covers only in 2011 in Latvia, which appears to a special case given its unusual 
combination of economic conditions: falling unemployment against a backdrop of 
economic contraction  (NOGRO*~INCUNEMP). This reflects Latvia’s distinct 
experience of an exceptionally deep and sudden recession followed by rapid recovery32 
and a very high level of exit from the labour force, mainly due to emigration.33  
                                                        
31 Letter “C” in path numbers indicates that these are paths from the conservative solution. Below we use the same 
notation for intermediate (I) and parsimonious (P) solutions as well as the parsimonious solution for negation (PN). 
The full outputs for all solutions can be found in the appendix to this paper. 
32  At the time of the election, growth had resumed 
33 Paul Krugman ‘Latvia and the Romney Record’, New York Times, 11 June 2012. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/11/latvia-and-the-romney-record/ (accessed 11 July 2013). 
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Third, it appears that both party system stability and party system instability can 
contribute to AERP breakthrough in different economic and social contexts. This runs 
contrary to much literature on party and party system, which usually suggest in a 
somewhat undifferentiated way that, once established, stability tends to endure ‘locking 
in’ through processes of institutionalisation (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). 
 
Crafting an intermediate solution 
Before attempting to draw firmer specific conclusions, however, it is necessary to refine 
our solution by, if we can, identifying simpler consistent paths sufficient for AERP 
breakthrough. fsQCA allows us to do this by incorporating counter-factual cases 
(logically possible combinations of conditions with no matching real life case) into our 
analysis. We can do so either by including all such ‘logical remainders’ in the 
minimisation process (creating a highly parsimonious solution) or by incorporating only 
‘logical remainders’ which appear to be ‘good counterfactuals’ that are (a) empirically 
possible, (b) do not contradict assumptions made elsewhere in the process of analysis and 
(c) are theoretically justified (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 168-175,199).34 Such 
‘intermediate solutions’ are often the preferred focus for fsQCA researchers as they are 
typically simpler and more elegant than conservative solutions without being reliant on 
large numbers of counterfactuals. 
We argue that no combination of conditions included in the analysis is impossible; 
recession coupled with decreasing unemployment is perhaps unlikely, but we contend that 
it can occur (see discussion on recession with a social safety valve) does not qualify as the 
proverbial “pregnant man” situation (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 207-9).  
Finally, contradictions between conditions of necessity and sufficiency are also not 
possible as we did not previously detect any necessary conditions. We identified three 
‘contradictory assumptions’ – combinations of conditions which in standard analysis 
would have produced both the positive outcome (BREAKTHRU) and its negation 
(~BREAKTRHU). Thereafter, we explicitly specified whether they should lead to 
BREAKTHRU or ~BREAKTHRU.35  
Researchers’ decisions about the ‘directionality’ are often guided by findings in the 
established literature. However, for theory-building in the absence of a large literature, 
such expectations must be derived from case knowledge and close examination of the 
conservative solutions. 
Examining the conservative solution, we were struck by the fact that only one condition, 
increasing corruption (INCORR), was present in only positive form. All the others appear 
in different paths in both positive and negative form – that is they appear to work 
differently in different context. Were these simply artefacts resulting from the limited 
number of cases examined in the conservative solution or could they plausibly be 
explained in theoretical terms?  
                                                        
34 The first two are relevant for both intermediate and parsimonious solutions, theoretically justified directional 
expectations are only used for intermediate solutions. 
35 Using the technique proposed by Duşa & Thiem (2013: 77-78) in R, we found three CSAs: 
~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*~INCCORR*HGENP (truth table row 14), 
NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP (row 17),  
NOGRO*INCUNEMP*~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP (row 25). All solutions reported here are calculated with 
CSAs eliminated (outcome manually recoded in the truth table in R), based on expectation that the first combination 
leads to an AERP breakthrough the last two no breakthrough. 
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After reflection we concluded that all four conditions other than INCORR could plausibly 
be interpreted as contributing to AERP breakthroughs in either positive or negative form 
depending on the wider configuration of causes. Thus while unstable party systems might 
provide opportunities to for new parties, stable party systems might in some contexts do 
the same so if they had become rigid, unresponsive or oligarchical.  
Rising unemployment and economic contraction might, as we initially anticipated, drive 
electoral discontent with establishment parties. However, turning to the cases in path C2 
(Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2008, Lithuania 2012) we judged that it might 
be plausible in some contexts that falling unemployment and a buoyant economy could 
provide a cue for voters to turn away from economic issues and focus on questions of 
corruption or governance – thus opening up opportunities for AERPs.  
High corruption might understandably favour new anti-establishment parties in many 
contexts. However, low corruption too we concluded could plausibly be interpreted as 
sometimes combining to create circumstances favour AERP breakthrough. Rapidly 
increasing perceived corruption in a relatively low corruption environment – a 
configuration (INCCORR *~HICORR) which appears in two of our paths (C2, C4) - 
might have an especially shocking and mobilisatory effect.  
 
The intermediate solution generated produced five sufficient paths.  
 
~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR               I1: BGR01, BGR09,LTU00, POL01, SVK02, SVK10, SVK12 
~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP                    I2: BGR09,LTU04, LTU08, LTU12,LVA02, SVK10, SVK12  
~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*INCCORR      I3 : EST03, LTU04, LTU12  
NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*~HGENP  I4 : CZE10, HUN10, SVN11  
NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*~HGENP       I5 : LVA11  
→ BREAKTHRU 
 
These broadly resemble those of the conservative solution above confirming the validity 
of the general insights noted above.36  However, examined more closely they also enable 
us to identify five distinct contexts favourable to AERP breakthrough: 
 
I1. Corrupt socially painful growth (~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR)              
This scenario sees rising unemployment (INCUNEMP) combine with economic growth 
(~NOGRO) and a background of high perceived corruption (HICORR). This corresponds 
to a context of apparently successful economic reform or restructuring, whose costs and 
benefits are, nevertheless, perceived as unjustly distributed both because of the 
(inevitably) disproportionate impact of unemployment and high levels of perceived 
corruption. It an experience largely characteristic of phase of post-communist reform for 
some states shortly before the EU accession in 2000-2 (Lithuania 2000, Poland 2001, 
Slovakia 2002) as well as of Slovakia in 2010 and 2012 as it recovered from 2008-9 
recession.  
                                                        
36 Running an analysis which set positive directional expectations for all conditions - in line with our initial expectations 
- produced two intermediate solutions.  As can be seen in the appendix, one was identical to intermediate solution 
reported over and the second was very similar. The main difference was that it grouped most Central European 
cases together in a row containing the INCUNEMP condition.  
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I2. Growth but increasing corruption in an unstable party system 
(~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP)      
This path shows that a context of economic growth (~NOGRO) increasing corruption 
combined with an unstable party system (a history of successful new parties) 
(INCCORR*HGENP) will favour AERP breakthrough. The configuration suggests that even 
where the economy is growing if corruption is also increasing voters will turn to AERPs 
in large numbers when there is already a tradition voting for new parties – or, as it may 
also be interpreted, where previously established parties have been weakened by earlier 
episodes of new party success.  
 
I3. Low and rising corruption in economic good times 
(~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*INCCORR) 
Like the first intermediate path (I1), the third intermediate path, which covers three 
elections in Baltic states (Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2012) also highlights 
the way in which corruption can interact with a seemingly benign socio-economic 
climate. In these cases a favourable context for AERP breakthrough is created by rising 
levels of corruption in the context of low overall corruption and a buoyant economy with 
both growth and falling unemployment (~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP). Increases in perceived 
corruption in a relatively low corruption environment have a galvanising effect, while 
improvement in the economy allows (some) voters to refocus on issues of corruption and 
governance. 
 
I4. Recession and rising corruption in rigid party systems 
(NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*~HGENP) 
The stable Czech, Hungarian and Slovene party systems were generally resistant to AERP 
breakthroughs until the first elections following the 2008-9 recession. At this point, a 
configuration of recession (NOGRO*INCUNEMP), rising perceived corruption (INCCORR) 
and the previous stability of the established party system (~HGENP) combined to create 
favourably conditions for AERP breakthrough. In all three cases the inability of (some or 
all) long established parties credibly to respond to economic crisis and their de-
legitimation by growing concerns with corruption and dishonesty prepared the ground for 
an AERP breakthrough.37 Strikingly, in this configuration in a context of recession it is 
party stability rather than party system fluidity that contributed to AERP breakthrough: 38 
long established parties appeared ossified, corrupt, out-of-touch and an obstacle to the 
solution both of urgent social and economic problems and longer term modernisation 
(Batory 2010; Haughton, Novotná & Deegan-Krause 2011; Haughton & Krašovec 
2011).39 
 
I5. Latvia’s way? NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*~HGENP 
                                                        
37 In Hungary 2010 the far-right party Jobbik also made a breakthrough, although we do not classify this grouping as an 
AERP because of its traditional radical-right politics. 
38 Indeed as our below of analysis of paths leading to the non-occurrence of AERP breakthrough (the negation of the 
solution) below suggest, stable party systems do little to prevent AERP breakthrough.  
39 In these three elections, Hungary’s Fidesz was the only established party to make major gains. 
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As in our initial, conservative solution the breakthrough of the Zatlers Reform Party in 
Latvia’s 2011 election appears unique case represented by its own a distinct causal path, 
albeit one close to in some ways to the recession and rising corruption in rigid party 
systems path experienced by some Visegrad states (path I4). Economic contraction 
(NOGRO) was combined with an increasingly stable, but oligarchical party 
establishment. In Latvia in 2011, however, the economic context was characterised only a 
background of economic contraction (NOGRO) without rising unemployment, given an 
unusually sharp and deep recession and mass emigration. Latvia’s path to AERP 
breakthrough is also characterised by high and increasing perceived corruption 
(HICORR*INCORR), rather than merely increasing corruption as in path I4. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Economics versus corruption? 
Overall, however, the solution shows high levels of consistency (0.85) and coverage 
(0.81) and the paths can be interpreted in ways which plausibly fit with case knowledge. 
The solution also demonstrates that there are multiple paths to the electoral breakthrough 
of new anti-establishment reformers in CEE, each of which combines economic, social 
and party-political conditions in different way. Blanket, mono-causal assumptions about 
the impacts of economic contraction (or growth); low and high levels of corruption; or 
previous party system (in)stability therefore need to be set aside. 
The solution can – and should - however be interpreted further. In keeping with much 
recent commentary about the role of austerity in bringing to a head the crisis of European 
party democracy (Krastev 2013; Van Biezen & Wallace 2013), we have framed our 
analysis in terms of sets of contrasting socio-economic conditions qualified by different 
patterns of corruption. This has yielded valuable insights, mostly notably the counter-
intuitive finding that more AERPs in CEE broke through in conditions of economic 
growth than of economic contraction. 
However, the sufficient five paths of our intermediate solution can be viewed somewhat 
differently: given that rising corruption (INCORR) is present in four of the five paths, the 
solution can simplified as:  
 
 
This presents a somewhat different story about the broad and deleterious effects of rising 
corruption as the most common driver of AERP breakthrough, albeit one which is 
refracted through varying sets of economic and party-political circumstances.  This 
emerges most clearly if we turn to the most minimised parsimonious form of the solution: 
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The importance of INCORR – and the presence in all paths of at least one condition 
relating to corruption – lends qualified support to perspectives which stress the 
importance of governance structures and citizen-politician relationships. However it 
leaves open the question of just how they matter. The pattern uncovered could be 
interpreted as suggesting that AERP breakthroughs will be confined to regions with weak, 
corrupt or corruptible institutions such as Eastern or Southern Europe. If, however, we see 
changes in perceived corruption as relatively independent of the performance of 
institutions and elites – perhaps as an expression of anti-political sentiments rooted in a 
deeper malaise of representative democracy (Mair 2006) – then AERPs may potentially 
become a more widespread phenomenon.  
The parsimonious solution also sharply poses a number of questions about how we should 
understand parties and party systems.  Stable party systems appear a somewhat mercurial 
phenomenon that can in certain circumstances ‘tip’ into contributing to its own demise: 
when established parties fail to deliver growth and perceptions of corruption, many voters 
who may previously have tolerated their failings turn against them as oligarchical 
‘dinosaurs’. This should prompt to ask if, and under what circumstances, stable party 
system help block the emergence of AERPs - a point we return to below in the discussion 
on negation of the solution. 
 
Spirals of instability? The sequencing of AERP breakthroughs 
fsQCA is not highly attuned to temporal patterns (Rihoux & Ragin 2009). However, our 
use of individual elections as cases allows not only to compare across contexts and 
countries, but also to look across the paths to detect possible patterns of sequencing. 
Arguments about the unfolding of party system dynamics across time are coming to play 
an important role in debates about the development of party-based democracy in CEE 
(see, for example Pop-Eleches 2010 or Mair & Casal Bértoa 2012). 
Kevin Deegan-Krause (2007; see also Deegan Krause & Haughton 2010) has argued that 
CEE party systems will experience repeated breakthroughs by new anti-establishment 
parties using anti-corruption issues to mobilise voters.  The initial breakthrough of a new 
party, he suggests, creates favourable conditions for subsequent (bigger) breakthroughs by 
other, newer anti-establishment parties. Successful (but usually short-lived) new anti-
establishment parties not only weaken their establishment competitors, but coalition 
government weaker and less effective, preparing the ground for new anti-establishment 
parties to take the field. This raises the prospect that (some) CEE democracies are 
entering an accelerating spiral of protest, instability and weak governance. 
In our work on AERPs we find some confirmation for this thesis, albeit to a very limited 
degree. Many states in the region do not experience successive or repeated AERP 
breakthroughs, but some do. The pattern suggested by Deegan-Krause suggested appears 
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most clear in the case of Lithuania, which experienced AERP breakthroughs in every 
‘third generation’ election in our sample. Latvia (1998, 2002) and Slovakia (2010, 2012) 
also saw AERP breakthroughs at successive elections, while Bulgaria had two quite 
closely AERP breakthroughs (2001 and 2009). There is, however, limited evidence of any 
process of ‘increasing returns’ of the type envisaged by Deegan-Krause.40 There are two 
very major AERP breakthroughs in Bulgaria, which can be linked: the collapse of the 
Simeon II Movement, which disrupted the established party system by breaking through 
in 2001, arguably prepared the ground for the emergence of GERB in 2009. However, 
breakthroughs by AERPs in Lithuania have become more limited over time, while the 
2012 breakthrough by Ordinary People (OLaNO) in Slovakia was on a similar small scale 
to that of Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in 2010. 
Moreover, our (intermediate) solution suggests a potential insight into the sequencing of 
the paths to leading to repeated AERP breakthroughs.  Most instances of multiple AERP 
breakthroughs in the same state are covered by two of the five paths: path I1 and path I2. 
The two partly overlap, covering Bulgaria 2009, Slovakia 2010 and Slovakia 2012. ) - 
where converging causal processes appear to have been at work.  However, initial AERP 
breakthroughs in such states (Lithuania 2000, Bulgaria 2001, Poland 2001, Slovakia 
2002) are covered by only one path, I1 corrupt socially painful growth.   
By contrast, all of the cases covered by path I2 - growth with increasing corruption in an 
unstable party system – are repeat AERP breakthroughs.41 This suggests that corrupt 
socially painful growth provides a context for initial AERP breakthrough while rising 
corruption regardless of changes in unemployment in the (now) unstable party system 
provides the context for further episodes. This pattern is especially marked in Lithuania 
where initial AERP breakthrough (by the New Union in 2000) is covered only by the first 
path (1), while all subsequent breakthroughs in Lithuania are covered by path the second 
(I2).42 One potential causal mechanism that may be at work in path I2 (and I3) is that, 
faced with high levels of instability and uncertainty in a context of growth,  incumbents 
may paradoxically have an incentive to pursue unaccountable (corrupt) policies, setting 
the scene for the emergence of new anti-corruption parties (for a parallel argument see 
Sikk 2006: 154-55). 
As might be expected when the neat social science logic meets noisy empirical data, there 
are some of unexplained or incompletely explained cases. The cases of AERP 
breakthrough which appear in the lower half of the top right quadrant of figure 1 were 
much more limited than the highly favourable conditions would imply. The cases in 
question (Poland 2001, Hungary 2010, Slovakia 2012, Lithuania 2012), which are 
members of thee different causal pathways, will require following up more fully in post-
QCA case comparison (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 305-310). However, as an initial 
point of departure we would note that both in Poland 2001 and Hungary 2010 the 
presence of strong new, social populist and/or radical right parties appears to have 
dampened AERP success.43 
                                                        
40 Deegan-Krause, it should be stressed, does not hypothesise a direct election-to-election spiral, but suggests that the 
mean and/or median age of parties (weighed for representation) will tend to decrease over time. 
41 Latvia 2002 appears an exception because, as discussed below, the minor breakthrough of the New Party in Latvia in 
1998 is one of two cases that none of our five paths can account for. 
42 Lithuania 2004 and 2012 are also covered by path I3, but have higher membership in path I2. 
43  In Poland 2001 Self-Defence (SO0 (10.2%) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) (7.9%), in Hungary 2010 
Jobbik (16.1%). As noted above, in earlier iterations of this analysis, we considered the inclusion of a further 
condition RADICAL.  
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Figure 1: Membership in BREAKTRHU plotted against membership of 
intermediate solution 
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There are two cases of AERP breakthrough that are not explained by our solution set. The 
most prominent of these is the breakthrough of the Palikot Movement (RP) which polled 
10 per cent in Poland’s 2011 election. Although clearly an AERP of mainly ‘new faces’ 
with an anti-establishment message including a strong agenda for political reform, the 
configuration of conditions in Poland in 2011 (~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP) –
growing unemployment, but economic growth and low and falling corruption – should 
have relegated the RP to marginality.44 Indeed, the Polish context 2011 falls squarely into 
one the distinct paths otherwise leading to the failure of AERP breakthrough: the so-
called negation of the solution.  
 
Paths to AERP non-breakthrough - the negation of the solution 
It is axiomatic in QCA that the causal paths leading to the absence of the outcome 
condition – in this study the absence of an AERP breakthrough – will almost never be 
simply the inverse of causal path leading to the outcome. Such causal asymmetry, as it is 
termed, makes it good practice to run separate analysis of this absence, the negation) of 
the outcome. In our research there are, moreover, potentially strong normative and/or 
policy-related reasons for taking an interest in the negation of the solution: the eruption of 
AERPs is widely seen as negative phenomenon, which threatens the functionality and 
effectiveness of democratic and risks to creation of a spiral of ungovernability.45 Asking 
which socio-economic and political pathways lead AERPs not to break through in effect 
asks under what conditions established parties in CEE can endure (and potentially renew 
themselves) 
                                                        
44 The success of the RP may be attributed to exceptional strength of secular-religious divisions and ‘culture wars’ in 
Poland, which were strongly exploited by the anti-clerical, socially liberal RP in its election campaign (Szczerbiak 
2011). The (more limited) success of the New Party in Latvia in 1998 cannot be explained by any of the five sufficient 
causal paths.  
45 We do not ourselves adopt any normative position on the issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Accordingly, we ran fsQCA analyses on the negation of the solution (~BREAKTHRU) 
producing conservative, intermediate and parsimonious solutions.46 Unsurprisingly, given 
the negative nature of the outcome which corresponds empirically to the success of a 
diverse range of non-AERP parties, the conservative and intermediate solutions for the 
negation, were complex. Although consistency levels  are similar, for the same reason 
levels of coverage for negative solutions are also lower. In interpreting the paths blocking 
AERP breakthrough, we therefore focus on the parsimonious solution which offers are 
limited number of key causal configuration and somewhat higher coverage.47 
The parsimonious solution generated (based on consistency cut-off of 0.77 in the truth 
table; solution consistency 0.86, coverage 0.71) can be summarised algebraically as 
follows: 
~HICORR  PN1 EST99, HU98, HU06, POL97, POL11, SLN08, HUN02, EE07 
~INCORR *{ 
~INCUNEMP * HGENP  PN2 BLG05, EST07, LVA06, SLK06 
NOGRO * HGENP PN3 EST11, LVA10 
→ ~AERP   
Expressed in more naturally language, the solutions state that AERPs fail to breakthrough 
in three contexts: low and falling perceived corruption (P1);  or falling perceived 
corruption and decreasing unemployment in an unstable party system (P2);  or economic 
contraction in an unstable party system (P3). 
PN1 which covers elections  in Central European cases and Estonia, confirms the 
importance of corruption to the AERP phenomenon, suggesting that where corruption is 
seen as low and reducing established parties often face no strong AERP challenge. PN2 
which combines falling corruption (~INCORR) and decreasing unemployment 
(~INCUNEMP) tells a broadly similar story, but also includes the condition HGENP (a 
history of new party success). This can be explained as AERP fatigue.  All four cases on 
path PN” were preceded by a significant AERP breakthrough in the previous election, 
which saw the successful assume government office (Res Public in Estonia. New Era in 
Latvia. the Simeon II Movement in Bulgaria; and the Alliance of the New Citizen in 
Slovakia). Overall PN2 suggests improving employment and corruption conditions 
combine with AERP fatigue to promote a turn (back) to more established parties.48  
It is tempting therefore to conclude that established politicians in CEE seeking to counter 
the rise of AERPs should focus on managing perceptions of corruption- if they can 
picking their moment to coincide with good employment conditions or the problems 
successful anti-establishment parties may experience in office. However, it should be 
noted, many cases of AERP non-breakthrough cannot be consistently explained by our 
solution for negation. These include elections in Poland in 2005, in the Czech Republic in 
2002 and 2006, in Poland in 2007 .  
                                                        
46 When crafting the negative intermediate solution, paralleling our assumptions for the positive solutions, we included 
directional for only condition: that decreasing corruption (~INCORR) would lead to the failure of AERP breakthrough 
(~BREAKTHRU). Contradictory simplifying assumptions were resolved as outlined above. 
47 Both conservative and intermediate solutions for negation are reproduced in the appendix. 
48 This interpretation holds partially for the election in Slovakia in 2006, where the largest gains were made by SMER. 
Although we classify SMER as an AERP in 2002, we view it has having transformed into a more conventional 
centre-left social-democratic party by 2006. The far-right also (re)gained support. 
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The third path (PN3) economic contraction in an unstable party system 
(NOGRO*HGENP), which covers Latvia in 2010 and Estonia in 2011, presents more 
difficulties of interpretation.  However, it could read as showing that voters in unstable 
party systems lose a taste for political novelty in or shortly after  economic contraction.  
Although in fsQCA solutions for the negation should not simply be regarded as the 
inverse of positive solution, in this instance it is striking that path (PN3) mirrors our 
earlier findings that one route to AERP breakthrough was characterised by economic 
contraction in a stable party system. Moreover, party system stability (~HGENP) does not 
appear in any of the pathways of the intermediate or parsimonious solutions for 
negation.49 Taken together this raises the possibility that the stability of even apparently 
more institutionalised, ‘closed’ party systems in CEE was the product of a conjuncture of 
economic and governance (corruption) conditions, rather than the self-sustaining process 
of institutional anchoring sometimes envisaged in literature. Such question, however, fall 
outside the main empirical issues addressed by this paper.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings in this study provide a broadly consistent explanation for the political 
breakthroughs achieved in Central and Eastern Europe since 1999 by a group of parties 
that we term anti-establishment reform parties and others call ‘centrist populist’. This 
suggests that – at least in broad terms – that the grouping has a degree of coherence and 
should be regarded as more than ragbag, residual category of otherwise hard-to-label 
protest parties. Our study clearly suggests that further comparative and conceptual work 
on this group of parties is justified.  
At the same time our work suggests that any attempt to find broad mono-causal 
explanations for the rise of new anti-establishment parties in CEE – and by extension in 
Europe generally – is misconceived. We identify five sufficient causal paths which, 
although sometimes overlapping, are generally distinct and suggest some clear patterns of 
cross-national and cross-temporal variation. Our findings also suggest that early debates 
(implicitly) framing the rise of new anti-establishment parties as reflecting either a crisis 
of politics and dysfunctional/corrupt governance or the impact of recession, austerity and 
hard times are misplaced. We find that paths to AERP breakthrough are invariably 
characterised by combinations of conditions relating to corruption, economics and party 
system dynamics. Debates we suggest therefore need to be explicitly re-framed in terms of 
configurations of causes centring on the relationship(s) between economics, corruption 
and governance and party systems. 
Finally, our research highlights such relationships can often be counter-intuitive: in CEE 
anti-establishment reform parties more often broken through in economic good times than 
bad; party system stability is many circumstances to be more favourable for AERP 
breakthrough than party system fluidity; changes in perceived corruption often matter 
more than levels of  perceived corruption, with rising corruption in a low corruption 
environment notably effective in mobilizing voters behind anti-establishment reformers.  
Our work in this paper adds to a small but growing body of work on the new phenomenon 
of reformist anti-establishment parties, rather than parties of the radical right or 
                                                        
49 It does, however, appear in one of the four paths of the conservative solution for negation (Bulgaria 2005, Latvia, 
Slovakia 2006, Estonia 2007) See appendix for details. 
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radical/libertarian, which have dominated the literature on new parties and ‘populist’ 
phenomena in European politics. It represents, we believe, one of the most systematic and 
robust comparisons of the topic so far undertaken. We would, however, stress that we see 
our findings as an early contribution to an emerging field with much scope for further 
development and refinement.50 
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Appendix: QCA Analysis 
 
Set memberships for the five conditions and outcome (BREAKTHRU) 
Election NOGRO INCUNEMP HICORR INCCORR HGENP BREAKTHRU 
BGR01 0.005 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.019 1.000 
BGR09 0.000 0.688 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 
SVN11 0.990 0.996 0.000 0.996 0.010 1.000 
LTU04 0.000 0.035 0.348 0.875 0.920 0.998 
CZE10 0.726 0.999 0.132 0.996 0.021 0.998 
EST03 0.000 0.035 0.002 0.875 0.038 0.995 
LVA02 0.000 0.201 1.000 0.544 0.666 0.994 
SVK02 0.034 0.644 0.999 0.544 0.048 0.987 
LVA11 1.000 0.035 0.909 1.000 0.005 0.987 
LTU00 0.011 0.995 0.998 0.066 0.258 0.978 
LTU08 0.000 0.799 0.222 0.544 0.997 0.919 
SVK10 0.362 1.000 0.683 0.999 0.999 0.824 
SVK12 0.005 0.549 0.990 1.000 0.996 0.790 
POL11 0.022 0.977 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.739 
LTU12 0.007 0.000 0.222 0.875 0.997 0.699 
POL01 0.002 1.000 0.979 1.000 0.004 0.679 
HUN10 0.983 1.000 0.042 0.976 0.002 0.536 
LVA98 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.330 0.207 0.526 
BGR05 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.180 1.000 0.001 
CZE02 0.006 0.059 0.995 1.000 0.010 0.001 
CZE06 0.000 0.126 0.909 0.001 0.009 0.001 
EST07 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.001 
EST11 0.999 0.099 0.000 0.875 0.979 0.001 
EST99 0.000 0.966 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.001 
HUN02 0.004 0.431 0.012 0.180 0.014 0.001 
HUN06 0.002 0.977 0.075 0.039 0.007 0.001 
HUN98 0.094 0.012 0.026 0.001 0.014 0.001 
LVA06 0.000 0.001 0.956 0.001 0.993 0.001 
LVA10 1.000 1.000 0.683 0.996 0.993 0.001 
POL05 0.002 0.020 1.000 1.000 0.416 0.001 
POL07 0.001 0.000 0.999 0.039 0.416 0.001 
POL97 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 
SVK06 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.000 0.999 0.001 
SVN08 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.001 
 
 
 
Necessity for BREAKTHRU 
         Consistency   PRI  cov.r  
--------------------------------  
1  INCCORR   0.721  0.582  0.667  
2  INCUNEMP  0.622  0.516  0.663  
--------------------------------  
 
Necessity for ~BREAKTHRU 
               Consistency PRI   cov.r  
--------------------------------------  
1  inccorr         0.693  0.628  0.744  
2  incunemp        0.730  0.663  0.693  
3  nogro*inccorr   0.680  0.617  0.742  
4  nogro*incunemp  0.675  0.610  0.714  
--------------------------------------  
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Truth table (outcome: BREAKTHRU) 
 
    NOGRO INCUNEMP HICORR INCCORR HGENP OUT n  incl  PRI   cases                   
23    1      0       1       1      0    1  1  0.989 0.988 LVA11                   
16    0      1       1       1      1    1  3  0.982 0.977 BGR09,SVK10,SVK12       
12    0      1       0       1      1    1  1  0.977 0.968 LTU08                   
14    0      1       1       0      1    1  0  0.955 0.946                         
31    1      1       1       1      0    ?  0  0.940 0.910                         
 4    0      0       0       1      1    1  2  0.929 0.907 LTU04,LTU12             
13    0      1       1       0      0    1  2  0.917 0.914 BGR01,LTU00             
10    0      1       0       0      1    ?  0  0.865 0.838                         
24    1      0       1       1      1    ?  0  0.857 0.663                         
29    1      1       1       0      0    ?  0  0.838 0.604                         
27    1      1       0       1      0    1  3  0.834 0.798 CZE10,HUN10,SVN11       
 3    0      0       0       1      0    1  1  0.827 0.822 EST03                   
19    1      0       0       1      0    ?  0  0.801 0.741                         
15    0      1       1       1      0    1  2  0.798 0.752 POL01,SVK02             
 8    0      0       1       1      1    1  1  0.781 0.707 LVA02                   
30    1      1       1       0      1    ?  0  0.775 0.605                         
22    1      0       1       0      1    ?  0  0.762 0.554                         
21    1      0       1       0      0    ?  0  0.676 0.421                         
11    0      1       0       1      0    ?  0  0.651 0.610                         
25    1      1       0       0      0    0  0  0.622 0.139                         
28    1      1       0       1      1    ?  0  0.469 0.288                         
 5    0      0       1       0      0    0  3  0.444 0.325 CZE06,LVA98,POL07       
 7    0      0       1       1      0    0  2  0.414 0.320 CZE02,POL05             
32    1      1       1       1      1    0  1  0.393 0.246 LVA10                   
 2    0      0       0       0      1    0  1  0.297 0.187 EST07                   
 6    0      0       1       0      1    0  3  0.274 0.189 BGR05,LVA06,SVK06       
17    1      0       0       0      0    0  0  0.252 0.032                         
 9    0      1       0       0      0    0  3  0.239 0.168 EST99,HUN06,POL11       
26    1      1       0       0      1    ?  0  0.163 0.052                         
18    1      0       0       0      1    ?  0  0.146 0.027                         
 1    0      0       0       0      0    0  4  0.066 0.053 HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08 
20    1      0       0       1      1    0  1  0.037 0.004 EST11                   
 
 
Truth table (outcome: ~BREAKTHRU) 
 
    NOGRO INCUNEMP HICORR INCCORR HGENP OUT n  incl  PRI   cases                   
20    1      0       0       1      1    1  1  0.996 0.996 EST11                   
18    1      0       0       0      1    ?  0  0.976 0.973                         
17    1      0       0       0      0    1  0  0.975 0.968                         
26    1      1       0       0      1    ?  0  0.954 0.948                         
 1    0      0       0       0      0    1  4  0.947 0.947 HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08 
25    1      1       0       0      0    1  0  0.939 0.861                         
 2    0      0       0       0      1    1  1  0.838 0.813 EST07                   
 6    0      0       1       0      1    1  3  0.831 0.811 BGR05,LVA06,SVK06       
32    1      1       1       1      1    1  1  0.802 0.754 LVA10                   
28    1      1       0       1      1    ?  0  0.786 0.712                         
 9    0      1       0       0      0    1  3  0.779 0.759 EST99,HUN06,POL11       
21    1      0       1       0      0    ?  0  0.764 0.579                         
29    1      1       1       0      0    ?  0  0.752 0.396                         
 7    0      0       1       1      0    0  2  0.725 0.680 CZE02,POL05             
24    1      0       1       1      1    ?  0  0.718 0.337                         
22    1      0       1       0      1    ?  0  0.704 0.446                         
 5    0      0       1       0      0    0  3  0.684 0.617 CZE06,LVA98,POL07       
30    1      1       1       0      1    ?  0  0.655 0.395                         
 8    0      0       1       1      1    0  1  0.471 0.293 LVA02                   
11    0      1       0       1      0    ?  0  0.454 0.390                         
19    1      0       0       1      0    ?  0  0.429 0.259                         
31    1      1       1       1      0    ?  0  0.394 0.090                         
12    0      1       0       1      1    0  1  0.312 0.032 LTU08                   
10    0      1       0       0      1    ?  0  0.303 0.162                         
 4    0      0       0       1      1    0  2  0.263 0.033 LTU04,LTU12             
15    0      1       1       1      0    0  2  0.249 0.074 POL01,SVK02             
16    0      1       1       1      1    0  3  0.227 0.023 BGR09,SVK10,SVK12       
14    0      1       1       0      1    0  0  0.211 0.054                         
 3    0      0       0       1      0    0  1  0.199 0.178 EST03                   
27    1      1       0       1      0    0  3  0.193 0.015 CZE10,HUN10,SVN11       
13    0      1       1       0      0    0  2  0.115 0.086 BGR01,LTU00             
23    1      0       1       1      0    0  1  0.059 0.012 LVA11                   
 
Notes: bold – rows above consistency cut-off (threshold); italics – rows examined because of contradictory simplifying 
assumptions.
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CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION (BREAKTHRU) 
Number of multiple-covered cases: 2  
S1: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR*hgenp + nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR + 
NOGRO*incunemp*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp + NOGRO*INCUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp 
 
                                        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  nogro*INCCORR*HGENP                  0.841  0.810  0.351  0.225  BGR09 LTU04 LTU08 LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 SVK12  
2  nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR*hgenp          0.852  0.836  0.221  0.188  BGR01 LTU00 POL01 SVK02  
3  nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR        0.889  0.870  0.157  0.053  EST03 LTU04 LTU12  
4  NOGRO*incunemp*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp  0.989  0.988  0.062  0.056  LVA11  
5  NOGRO*INCUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp  0.834  0.798  0.147  0.134  CZE10,HUN10,SVN11  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   S1                                   0.849  0.827  0.792  
 
CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION (~BREAKTHRU) 
 
Number of multiple-covered cases: 0  
S1: nogro*hicorr*inccorr*hgenp + nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP + 
NOGRO*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP 
 
                                        incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  nogro*hicorr*inccorr*hgenp           0.867  0.861  0.328  0.320  HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08; EST99,HUN06,POL11  
2  nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP         0.861  0.848  0.259  0.250  EST07; BGR05,LVA06,SVK06  
3  NOGRO*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR*HGENP  0.996  0.996  0.050  0.048  EST11  
4  NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP  0.802  0.754  0.050  0.047  LVA10  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   S1                                   0.875  0.866  0.675 
 
PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION (BREAKTHRU) 
Number of multiple-covered cases: 4  
S1: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + 
(hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp)  
S2: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + 
(nogro*hicorr*INCCORR)  
                                               -------------------  
                          incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  (S1)   (S2)   cases  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  nogro*INCCORR*HGENP    0.841  0.810  0.351  0.085  0.186  0.085  BGR09, LTU04, LTU08, LTU12, SVK10, SVK12 BGR09 
LTU04 LTU08 LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 SVK12 
2  NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp    0.872  0.851  0.211  0.057  0.057  0.188  CZE10, HUN10, LVA11, SVN11,  
3  nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR  0.905  0.890  0.370  0.203  0.203  0.203  BGR01, BGR09, LTU00, POL01, SVK02, SVK10, SVK12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
4  hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp   0.839  0.815  0.222  0.009  0.063         CZE10, EST03, HUN10, SVN11  
5  nogro*hicorr*INCCORR   0.914  0.897  0.219  0.000         0.053  EST03, LTU04, LTU08, LTU12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   S1                     0.851  0.831  0.822  
   S2                     0.850  0.829  0.813  
 
PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION (~BREAKTHRU) 
Number of multiple-covered cases: 1  
S1: hicorr*inccorr + NOGRO*HGENP + incunemp*inccorr*HGENP 
 
                           incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  hicorr*inccorr          0.849  0.840  0.414  0.328  EST99, EST07, HUN98,HUN02,HUN06,POL97,SVN08, POL11  
2  NOGRO*HGENP             0.902  0.892  0.121  0.111  EST11; LVA10  
3  incunemp*inccorr*HGENP  0.864  0.852  0.266  0.179  BGR05, EST07, LVA06, SVK06 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   S1                      0.863  0.854  0.706  
 
 
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION (BREAKTHRU) 
 
p.sol: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp 
S1:    nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp + 
NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR  
 
                                  incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  nogro*INCCORR*HGENP            0.841  0.810  0.351  0.105  BGR09,LTU04, LTU08, LTU12,LVA02, SVK10, SVK12  
2  nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR          0.905  0.890  0.370  0.204  BGR01, BGR09,LTU00, POL01, SVK02, SVK10, SVK12 
3  NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp     0.985  0.984  0.073  0.056  LVA11  
4  nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR  0.889  0.870  0.157  0.053  EST03, LTU04, LTU12  
5  NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*hgenp   0.831  0.793  0.150  0.132  CZE10, HUN10, SVN11  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   S1                             0.850  0.828  0.808  
 
 
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION (~BREAKTHRU) 
 
p.sol: hicorr*inccorr + NOGRO*HGENP + incunemp*inccorr*HGENP 
 
S1:    hicorr*inccorr*hgenp + NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP + nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP + 
NOGRO*incunemp*INCCORR*HGENP  
 
                                 incl   PRI    cov.r  cov.u  cases  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1  hicorr*inccorr*hgenp          0.868  0.862  0.334  0.325  EST99, HUN98, HUN02, HUN06, POL97, POL11, SVN08  
2  NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP    0.803  0.754  0.050  0.047  LVA10  
3  nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP  0.861  0.848  0.259  0.250  BGR05, EST07, LVA06, SVK06  
4  NOGRO*incunemp*INCCORR*HGENP  0.974  0.972  0.051  0.047  EST11  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
   S1                            0.875  0.866  0.679 
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